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Abstract—A basic model for key agreement with biometric
or physical identifiers is extended to include measurements of
a hidden source through a general broadcast channel (BC). An
inner bound for strong secrecy, maximum key rate, and minimum
privacy-leakage and database-storage rates is proposed. The
inner bound is shown to be tight for physically-degraded and
less-noisy BCs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key generation from biometric or physical identifiers
such as fingerprints, uncontrollable fine variations of ring
oscillator (RO) outputs, or random start-up values of static
random access memories (SRAMs) is a promising alterna-
tive to key storage in a non-volatile memory (NVM) [1].
Physical identifiers for digital devices, such as Internet-of-
Things (IoT) devices, can be implemented using physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) [1]. One can also use PUFs at the
transmitter as a source of local randomness [2, Chapter 1]. For
instance, consider the wiretap channel [3] where a transmitter
sends a message through a broadcast channel (BC) [4] so
that a legitimate receiver can reliably decode the message,
while the message is hidden from an eavesdropper by using a
randomized encoder with random bits supplied by a PUF.
We use the source model for key agreement from [5], [6]
to characterize rate regions for PUFs. Based on a source
observation, an encoder generates a key and sends helper
data to a decoder, so the key agreement at the decoder is
successful. The helper data can be made public as long as the
information leaked about the secret key, i.e., secrecy leakage,
is negligible and the information leaked about the identifier
output, i.e., privacy leakage, is small [7], [8]. The amount of
storage should also be kept small to limit the hardware cost
[9].
Suppose the encoder generates a key from a noisy identifier
output and a decoder has access to another noisy measurement
of the same identifier and the helper data to reconstruct the
key. We call this model the generated-secret (GS) model.
Similarly, for the chosen-secret (CS) model, an embedded key
and noisy identifier measurements are combined to generate
the public helper data. We consider both models to address
different applications.
The source, noisy identifier, and measurement symbol
strings are related by a BC with one input and two outputs.
In [10], [11], the BC consists of two separate measurement
channels. We extend this model to capture the effects of
correlated noise in the measurements. As an example for this
case, RO oscillation frequencies depend on the surrounding
hardware logic, so the encoder and decoder measurements of
the same RO PUFs tend to be correlated [12].
We derive achievable key-leakage-storage rate tuples for a
general BC with strong secrecy. The separate-measurement
case in [10], [11] corresponds to a physically-degraded (PD)
BC, and the visible source model in [7], [8] corresponds to
a semi-deterministic BC. The rate region for another PD BC
scenario is given in this work, which does not follow from
previous results due to the asymmetry in the constraints. We
further establish the rate regions for less-noisy (LN) BCs
and derive results with strong privacy and strong secrecy.
We remark that in [7], [8], [13], a “private” key that is
available to the encoder and decoder and that is hidden
from the eavesdropper is considered to obtain strong privacy.
This assumption is not realistic since a private key requires
hardware protection against physical attacks, and if such a
protection is feasible then it is not necessary to use a PUF for
key generation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
our models and the problem. We give achievable key-leakage-
storage regions for the GS and CS models in Section III. The
proposed inner bounds are shown in Section IV to be tight for
classes of PD and LN BCs. We give an example in Section V
to illustrate the effects of delay and hardware cost on the
achieved rate tuples for a practical PUF design. Achievability
proofs for the inner bounds and converses for a LN case are
given in Sections VI and VII, respectively.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
Consider hidden identifier outputs Xn that are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with respect to a prob-
ability distribution PX . The encoder and decoder observe
noisy source measurements that are outputs of a BC P
X˜Y |X .
Suppose all alphabets are finite sets.
For the GS model shown in Fig. 1(a), the encoder generates
the helper data W and a secret key S from X˜n. The keys are
stored in a secure database and the helper data are stored in a
public database so that an eavesdropper has access only to the
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Fig. 1. Encoder and decoder measurements through a BC with (a) the GS
model and (b) the CS model.
helper data. This is the case for PUFs when the helper data
are stored without hardware protection. The eavesdropper does
not observe a random sequence correlated with the identifier
output. This is a valid assumption because for many physical
and biometric identifiers, invasive attacks would permanently
change the identifier outputs [14]. Furthermore, there are
algorithms such as in [15] to obtain almost i.i.d. outputs
measured through memoryless channels.
Using W and the BC measurements Y n, the decoder gener-
ates the key estimate Sˆ that is used for device authentication.
Similar steps are applied for the CS model in Fig. 1(b), except
that S is embedded into the encoder.
Definition 1. A
(
|W(n)|, |S(n)|, n
)
-code Cn for key agreement
with a hidden source with BC encoder and decoder measure-
ments consists of
• a GS model encoder f
(n)
1 : X˜
n →W(n) × S(n) or
a CS model encoder f
(n)
2 : X˜
n × S(n) →W(n),
• a decoder g(n) :W(n) × Yn → S(n). ♦
Definition 2. A (secret-key, privacy-leakage, storage), or (key-
leakage-storage), rate tuple (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) is achievable for the
GS and CS models with encoder and decoder measurements
through the BC P
X˜Y |X if, given any δ > 0, there is some
n≥1, and an encoder and a decoder for which Rs =
log |S|
n
and
Pr[S 6= Sˆ] ≤ δ (reliability) (1)
I(S;W ) ≤ δ (strong secrecy) (2)
1
n
I(Xn;W )≤Rℓ+δ (privacy) (3)
1
n
H(S) ≥ Rs − δ (uniformity) (4)
1
n
log |W| ≤ Rw + δ (storage). (5)
The key-leakage-storage regions Cgs for the GS model and Ccs
for the CS model are the closures of the set of all achievable
rate tuples. ♦
III. AN INNER BOUND
We are interested in characterizing the optimal trade-off
among the secret-key, privacy-leakage, and storage rates with
strong secrecy for BC measurements at the encoder and
decoder. We give achievable rate regions for the GS and CS
models in Theorem 1. The proofs are given Section VI.
Theorem 1 (Inner Bounds for the GS and CS Models). An
achievable rate region for the GS model is
Rgs=
⋃
P
U|X˜
{
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw) :
0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ), (6)
Rℓ ≥ max{0, I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )}, (7)
Rw≥I(U ; X˜)− I(U ;Y )
}
(8)
and an achievable rate region for the CS model is
Rcs=
⋃
P
U|X˜
{
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw) :
0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ), (9)
Rℓ ≥ max{0, I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )}, (10)
Rw≥I(U ; X˜)
}
(11)
where U − X˜ −XY forms a Markov chain for Rgs and Rcs.
Let R1 and as R2 be the rate regions characterized by (6)-
(8) when max{0, I(U ;X) − I(U ;Y )} is positive and zero,
respectively. One can limit the cardinality of U to |U|≤|X˜ |+
2 for R1 and to |U| ≤ |X˜ | + 1 for R2. Similarly, let R3
and R4 be the rate regions characterized by (9)-(11) when
max{0, I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y )} is positive and zero, respectively.
One can limit the cardinality of U to |U| ≤ |X˜ | + 2 for R3
and to |U| ≤ |X˜ |+ 1 for R4.
All regions are convex, and permitting randomization at the
encoder and decoder does not improve the regions (see (33)(a)
and (35)(b)).
IV. RATE REGIONS
Suppose we view X˜n as the input to the BC P
XY |X˜ .
This perspective lets us use known results for the classic
BC problem because the channel input X˜n can be viewed as
the encoder “output”. We characterize the key-leakage-storage
regions of special classes of BCs P
XY |X˜ for which the rate
regions given in Theorem 1 are tight.
The key agreement model used in [7], [8], which is called
the visible source model, corresponds to a semi-deterministic
BC such that P
XY |X˜ = 1{X = X˜}PY |X˜ , where 1{·} is
the indicator function. The source model considered in [10],
[11] corresponds to a physically-degraded (PD) BC such that
P
XY |X˜ = PX|X˜PY |X .
We show that the regions given in Theorem 1 are tight,
i.e., they are the key-leakage-storage regions, for the following
cases:
1) a PD BC such that P
XY |X˜ = PY |X˜PX|Y , which cor-
responds to the case where the identifier measurements
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Fig. 2. Storage vs. privacy-leakage rate projection of the boundary triples for
the GS model with pe=0.05.
at the decoder are better than at the encoder. There are
three different Markov chain conditions that can lead
to different rate regions due to the asymmetry in the
privacy constraint (3). Note that we consider here a PD
BC that has not been studied before.
2) LN BCs P
XY |X˜ such that either I(U ;X) ≥ I(U ;Y ) or
I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;X) for all P
U|X˜ where U − X˜ −XY
forms a Markov chain.
Remark 1. The rate regions depend on the joint conditional
probability distribution P
XY |X˜ rather than only the marginal
distributions P
X|X˜ and PY |X˜ . Thus, the key-leakage-storage
regions for the stochastically-degraded BCs are not necessarily
equal to the regions for the corresponding PD BCs, unlike in
the classic BC problem.
Remark 2. Since P
X˜XY
is fixed, the distinctions between the
LN BCs and essentially-less noisy (ELN) BCs is not needed.
Observe that the class of ELN BCs is a proper superset of the
class of LN BCs [16, Claim 2].
The key-leakage-storage regions are as follows.
Theorem 2 (PD BCs). Suppose X˜ − Y −X forms a Markov
chain. We have
Cgs = R2, Ccs = R4. (12)
Theorem 3 (LN BCs). Suppose P
XY |X˜ is a LN BC with
I(U ;X) ≥ I(U ;Y ) for all P
U|X˜ . We have
Cgs = R1, Ccs = R3. (13)
Suppose P
XY |X˜ is a LN BC with I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;X) for all
P
U|X˜ . We have
Cgs = R2, Ccs = R4. (14)
The achievability proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 below follow
from Theorem 1. In Section VII, we give the proofs of
converses for the BC rate regions in (13). The proofs of the
converses for Theorem 2 and the rate regions in (14) follow
similarly and are omitted.
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Fig. 3. Storage vs. secret-key rate projection of the boundary triples for the
GS model with pe=0.05.
Remark 3. The regions R2 and R4 provide strong privacy,
i.e., I(Xn;W ) vanishes when n→∞.
V. EXAMPLE
We now compare two different decoder-measurement sce-
narios to address the practicality of PUF designs for multiple
measurements. Consider the GS model with noisy measure-
ments of uniformly-distributed and hidden ring oscillator (RO)
PUF outputs Xn ∼ Bernn(12 ) through binary symmetric
channels (BSCs) P
X˜|X and PY |X after output quantization.
Since an encoder measurement is made by a manufacturer,
the temperature and voltage effects can be eliminated at the
encoder, so we assume an encoder measurement through a
BSC(0.05), i.e., the crossover probability is pe = 0.05. For
the decoder measurement, we assume that cheaper hardware
is used to decrease the cost. We model this first case as
multiple independent decoder measurements each through a
BSC(0.15), where the crossover probability is pd = 0.15.
The measurement delay increases linearly with each additional
measurement and with the number of ROs used.
As a second case, we can alternatively provide additional
protection against environmental effects, which increases the
hardware cost approximately linearly with the number of ROs
used [17]. We model this second case as a single decoder
measurement through a BSC(0.05), i.e., pd = 0.05.
We consider the multiple-measurement case with two, three,
and four decoder measurements through a BSC(0.15), and we
compare this with a single-measurement through a BSC(0.05).
We remark from [10, Theorem 3] that it suffices to consider
only the conditional probability distributions P
X˜|U that are
BSCs to characterize the rate regions for these channels. We
plot the projections of R1 for these scenarios onto the storage
vs. privacy-leakage rate plane (Rw, Rl) in Fig. 2 and onto
the storage vs. secret-key rate plane (Rw, Rs) in Fig. 3 to
compare the effects of linear delay and cost increases. Every
marker on each curve corresponds to evaluating the rate-region
boundaries for a fixed crossover probability P
X˜|U , so Figs. 2
and 3 should be considered jointly.
Fig. 2 shows that two BSC(0.15) decoder measurements
yield up to 19% less secret-key rate and up to 80% greater
privacy-leakage rate than a single BSC(0.05) decoder mea-
surement. However, four BSC(0.15) decoder measurements
result in better rate tuples than a single BSC(0.05) de-
coder measurement, whereas three BSC(0.15) measurements
achieve similar rate points as a single BSC(0.05). Since
additional costs and delays increase linearly with the num-
ber of ROs, the fair comparison is between the cases with
two BSC(0.15) measurements and one BSC(0.05) decoder
measurement. Thus, if hardware cost is not a bottleneck,
one should improve the system design as in, e.g., [17] to
obtain a better decoder-measurement channel PY |X rather than
measuring multiple times at the decoder.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We provide a proof that follows from the output statistics
of random binning (OSRB) [18] method by applying the steps
in [19, Section 1.6].
A. Proof for the GS Model
Proof Sketch: Fix a P
U|X˜ and let (U
n, X˜n, Xn, Y n) be
i.i.d. according to P
UX˜XY
= P
U|X˜PX˜PXY |X˜ . Assign three
random bin indices (S,W,C) to each un, where S is the secret
key, W is the helper data, and C is a public index. Assume
S ∈ [1 : 2nRs ], W ∈ [1 : 2nRw ], and C ∈ [1 : 2nRc ].
The reliability constraint (1) is satisfied by using a Slepian-
Wolf (SW) [20] decoder to estimate Un from (C,W, Y n) if
[18, Lemma 1]
Rc +Rw > H(U |Y ). (15)
The strong secrecy and key uniformity constraints in (2) and
(4), respectively, are satisfied if [18, Theorem 1]
Rs +Rw +Rc < H(U) (16)
since (16) ensures that the three random indices (S,W,C) are
almost mutually independent and uniformly distributed.
Similarly, the public randomness C is almost independent
of X˜n, so it is almost independent of (X˜n, Xn, Y n), if we
have [18, Theorem 1]
Rc < H(U |X˜). (17)
To satisfy the constraints (15)-(17), we fix the rates to
Rs = I(U ;Y )− 2ǫ (18)
Rw = I(U ; X˜)− I(U ;Y ) + 2ǫ (19)
Rc = H(U |X˜)− ǫ (20)
for some ǫ > 0 such that ǫ→ 0 when n→∞.
Consider the privacy leakage constraint in (3). We have
I(Xn;W |C) ≤ H(W )−H(W,C|Xn) +H(C). (21)
We need to consider two different cases.
Case 1: Suppose we have
Rc +Rw > H(U |X) (22)
i.e., H(U |Y ) ≥ H(U |X). Then we can recover Un from
(C,W,Xn) by using a SW decoder [18, Lemma 1].
Using (21), we have for Case 1 that
I(Xn;W |C)
(a)
≤ n(I(U ; X˜)− I(U ;Y ) + 2ǫ)−H(W,C|Xn)
+ n(H(U |X˜)− ǫ)
(b)
≤ n(H(U |Y ) + ǫ)−H(W,C,Un|Xn) + nǫn
(c)
≤ n(H(U |Y )−H(U |X) + ǫ+ ǫn)
= n(I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ) + ǫ+ ǫn) (23)
where (a) follows by (19) and (20), (b) follows from Fano’s
inequality applied to estimate Un from (C,W,Xn), given the
constraint in (22), for some ǫn > 0 such that ǫn → 0 when
n→∞, and (c) follows because (Un, Xn) is i.i.d.
Using the selection lemma [21, Lemma 2.2], there exists a
binning that achieves all rate tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) in the key-
leakage-storage region R1 with strong secrecy when n→∞.
Case 2: Suppose we have
Rc +Rw < H(U |X) (24)
i.e., H(U |Y ) < H(U |X). Then C and W are almost in-
dependent given Xn by [18, Theorem 1]. We remark that
[18, Theorem 1] provides an upper bound on the average
variational distance between the joint distribution of (C,W )
given Xn and the ideal joint distribution where C and W
are independent given Xn. The upper bound vanishes when
n→∞.
Using (21), we have for Case 2 that
I(Xn;W |C)
(a)
≤ H(W )− (H(W |Xn) +H(C|Xn)− ǫ′n) +H(C)
(b)
≤ H(W )−H(W |Xn)− (H(C)− ǫ′′n) +H(C) + ǫ
′
n
(c)
≤ H(W )− (H(W )− ǫ′′′n ) + ǫ
′
n + ǫ
′′
n
= ǫ′n + ǫ
′′
n + ǫ
′′′
n (25)
where
(a) follows from [22, Theorem 6] that provides an upper
bound on the entropy difference between two joint probability
distributions PCW |Xn and P˜CW |Xn = PC|XnPW |Xn with
a vanishing variational distance for some ǫ′n > 0 such that
ǫ′n → 0 when n→∞,
(b) follows because C is almost independent ofXn due to (17)
and by applying [22, Theorem 6] to this almost independence
result for some ǫ′′n > 0 such that ǫ
′′
n → 0 when n→∞,
(c) follows because Rw < H(U |X) for Case 2 so that W is
almost independent of Xn, so we can apply [22, Theorem 6]
also to this case for some ǫ′′′n > 0 such that ǫ
′′′
n → 0 when
n→∞.
Using the selection lemma, there exists a binning that
achieves all rate tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) in the key-leakage-
storage regionR2 with strong secrecy and strong privacy when
n→∞.
B. Proof for the CS Model
We use the achievability proof for the GS model. Suppose
the key S′, generated as in the GS model together with the
helper dataW ′ and public index C′, have the same cardinality
as the corresponding embedded secret key S, i.e., |S ′| = |S|.
The chosen key S is independent of (Xn, X˜n, Y n). Consider
the encoder f
(n)
2 with inputs (X˜
n, S) and output W = (S′ +
S,W ′). Suppose the decoder g(n) with inputs (Y n,W ) and
output Sˆ = S′ + S − Sˆ′, where all addition and subtraction
operations are modulo-|S|. The decoder of the GS model is
used to obtain Sˆ′.
We have the error probability
Pr[S 6= Sˆ] = Pr[S′ 6= Sˆ′] (26)
which is small due to the proof of achievability for the GS
model.
Using (18) and (19), and from the one-time padding oper-
ation applied above, we can achieve a storage rate of
Rw ≥ I(U ; X˜) (27)
for the CS model.
We have the secrecy leakage of
I(S;W |C′) = I(S;W ′|C′) + I(S;S′ + S|W ′, C′)
(a)
= H(S′ + S|W ′, C′)−H(S′|W ′, C′)
(b)
≤ nRs −H(S
′|C′) + I(S′;W ′|C′)
(c)
≤ nRs − (nRs − ǫ
(4)
n ) + I(S
′;W ′|C′)
(d)
≤ ǫ(4)n + ǫ
(5)
n (28)
where (a) follows because S is independent of (W ′, C′, S′),
(b) follows because |S ′| = |S|, (c) follows because S′ and
C′ are almost independent and uniformly distributed due to
(16) and [22, Theorem 6] provides an upper bound on the
entropy differences for some ǫ
(4)
n > 0 such that ǫ
(4)
n → 0 when
n → ∞, and (d) follows because the GS model satisfies the
strong secrecy constraint (2) due to (16) for some ǫ
(5)
n > 0
such that ǫ
(5)
n → 0 when n→∞.
We obtain the privacy-leakage of
I(Xn;W |C′)
≤ I(Xn;W ′|C′) +H(S + S′|W ′, C′)
−H(S + S′|Xn,W ′, C′, S′)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;W ′|C′) + log(|S|)−H(S)
(b)
= I(Xn;W ′|C′) (29)
where (a) follows because S is independent of
(Xn,W ′, S′, C′) and |S ′| = |S|, and (b) follows from
the uniformity of S. We therefore have the following results
for two different cases.
Case 1: Assume that H(U |Y ) ≥ H(U |X) for the fixed
P
U|X˜ . By combining (23) and (29), we obtain
I(Xn;W |C′)≤n(I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ) + ǫ+ ǫn). (30)
Using the selection lemma, there exists a binning that
achieves all rate tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) in the key-leakage-
storage region R3 with strong secrecy when n→∞.
Case 2: Suppose H(U |Y ) < H(U |X) for the fixed P
U|X˜ .
By combining (25) and (29), we have
I(Xn;W |C′) ≤ ǫ′n + ǫ
′′
n + ǫ
′′′
n . (31)
Using the selection lemma, there exists a binning that
achieves all rate tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) in the key-leakage-
storage regionR4 with strong secrecy and strong privacy when
n→∞.
C. Cardinality Bounds for Theorem 1
Using the support lemma [23], the auxiliary random variable
U should have |X˜ |−1 elements to preserve P
X˜
, and three more
to preserveH(X |U),H(X˜|U) andH(Y |U) for both theorems
when I(U ;X) − I(U ;Y ) > 0. When I(U ;X) − I(U ;Y ) ≤
0, as in R2 and R4, we do not need to preserve the term
H(X |U).
VII. CONVERSES FOR THE BC RATE REGIONS IN (13)
We use the following lemma to bound the secret-key,
privacy-leakage, and storage rates for a class of LN BCs.
Lemma 1 ([24]). For all LN BCs P
XY |X˜ with I(U ;X) ≥
I(U ;Y ) for all P
U|X˜ and a fixed PX˜ , we have
I(S,W, Y i−1;Yi) ≤ I(S,W,X
i−1;Yi) (32)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n if (S,W )−X˜n−(Xn, Y n) forms a Markov
chain.
Let Ui , (S,W,X
i−1), which satisfies the Markov chain
Ui − X˜i − (Xi, Yi) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
A. Proofs of Converses
Suppose for some δn>0 and n, there is a pair of encoders
and decoders such that (1)-(5) are satisfied for all LN BCs
P
XY |X˜ with I(U ;X) ≥ I(U ;Y ) for all PU|X˜ and a fixed
P
X˜
by some key-leakage-storage tuple (Rs, Rℓ, Rw). Using
(1) and Fano’s inequality, we obtain
H(S|W,Y n)
(a)
≤ H(S|Sˆ)≤nǫn (33)
where (a) permits randomized decoding, ǫn = δnRs +
Hb(δn)/n, where Hb(δ) = −δ log δ − (1 − δ) log(1 − δ) is
the binary entropy function, and ǫn→0 if δn→0.
Secret-key Rate: We obtain for the GS and CS models
n(Rs − δn)
(a)
≤ H(S)−H(S|W,Y n) + nǫn
(b)
≤ I(S;Y n|W ) + nǫn + δn
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(S,W, Y i−1;Yi) + ǫn +
δn
n
]
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(S,W,X i−1;Yi) + ǫn +
δn
n
]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ui;Yi) + ǫn +
δn
n
]
(34)
(a) follows by (4) and (33), (b) follows by (2), (c) follows
from Lemma 1, and (d) follows from the definition of Ui.
Storage Rate: Observe for the GS model that
n(Rw + δn)
(a)
≥ H(W |Y n) + I(W ;Y n)
(b)
≥ H(S,W, Y n)−H(Y n)−H(S|W,Y n)
−H(S,W |X˜n) + I(W ;Y n)
(c)
≥ I(S,W ; X˜n)− I(S,W ;Y n)− nǫn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(S,W, X˜ i−1; X˜i)−I(S,W, Y
i−1;Yi)−nǫn]
(e)
≥
n∑
i=1
[I(S,W,X i−1; X˜i)−I(S,W,X
i−1;Yi)−nǫn]
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui; X˜i)−I(Ui;Yi)−nǫn] (35)
where (a) follows by (5), (b) follows from the encoding
step, (c) follows by (33), (d) follows because the source and
channel are memoryless, (e) follows from the data-processing
inequality applied to the Markov chainX i−1−(S,W, X˜ i−1)−
X˜i and from Lemma 1, and (f) follows from the definition
of Ui.
Similarly, observe for the CS model that
n(Rw + δn)
(a)
≥ I(S,W ; X˜n)−H(S|W ) +H(S,W |X˜n)
(b)
≥ I(S,W ; X˜n) + I(S;W )
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(S,W, X˜ i−1; X˜i)
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(S,W,X i−1; X˜i)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; X˜i) (36)
where (a) follows by (5), (b) follows because X˜n is inde-
pendent of S, (c) follows because the source and channel
are memoryless, (d) follows by applying the data-processing
inequality to the Markov chain X i−1 − (S,W, X˜ i−1) − X˜i,
and (e) follows from the definition of Ui.
Privacy-leakage Rate: We have for the GS and CS models
that
n(Rl + δn)
(a)
≥ H(W |Y n)−H(W |Xn)
≥ H(S,W, Y n)−H(S|W,Y n)−H(Y n)−H(S,W |Xn)
(b)
≥ I(S,W ;Xn)− I(S,W ;Y n)− nǫn
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
[I(S,W,X i−1;Xi)− I(S,W,X
i−1;Yi)− ǫn]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui;Xi)− I(Ui;Yi)− ǫn] (37)
where (a) follows by (3), (b) follows by (33), (c) follows
because the channel and source are memoryless and from
Lemma 1, (d) follows from the definition of Ui.
Introduce a uniformly distributed time-sharing random vari-
able Q ∼ Unif[1 : n] independent of other random variables.
Define X =XQ, X˜= X˜Q, Y = YQ, and U =(UQ,Q) so that
U−X˜−X−Y forms a Markov chain. The converse for all
LN BCs P
XY |X˜ with I(U ;X) ≥ I(U ;Y ) for all PU|X˜ and a
fixed P
X˜
for the GS model follows by using the introduced
random variables in (34), (35), and (37), and letting δn → 0.
Similarly, the converse for the same class of channels for the
CS model follows by using the introduced random variables
in (34), (36), and (37), and letting δn → 0.
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